BCNL X DELOITTE JANUARY 2026 Amsterdam NL. image from linkendin
In 2016, being a blockchain developer in the Netherlands meant operating in a vacuum that was not simply a matter of limited resources or early-stage market uncertainty. It was a structural problem. There was no central body that could connect a protocol team in Groningen with a venture capitalist in The Hague. There was no annual event that gave the Dutch ecosystem a recognisable moment around which international attention could be organised. There was no institution with the credibility to sit across the table from a Ministry of Finance official and explain, with any authority, what the practical implications of a distributed ledger were for the regulatory frameworks the Netherlands had spent decades constructing. Rudolf van Ee and Jan Scheele looked at that vacuum and concluded that the solution was not another startup, not another protocol and not another whitepaper. The answer was an institution. They needed a foundation explicitly designed to provide the coordination that market forces alone would never produce.
What makes the Blockchain Netherlands Foundation BCNL worth examining closely a decade later is not the breadth of its activity, which is considerable, but the nature of the problem it was designed to solve and how accurately that diagnosis has aged. The founders’ starting position was that the Dutch blockchain ecosystem was failing not because of a shortage of talent, capital or technical ambition, but because of a coordination failure. Startups could not find each other. Investors had no trusted intermediary through which to evaluate early stage projects in a space where the signal to noise ratio was, in the mid-2010s, almost unusable. Government officials and regulators many of whom encountered the word “blockchain” in the same breath as the Silk Road prosecution had no credible institutional interlocutor who could separate the technology from its most sensational applications and explain what it actually meant for the financial infrastructure the Netherlands operated and depended on. Van Ee and Scheele were not solving a technology problem. They were solving a trust infrastructure problem, which is a materially different challenge and one that requires a different kind of organisation to address.
The division of labour between the two founders reflects a clear-eyed understanding of what that challenge demanded in practice. Van Ee brought fifteen years of ecosystem development experience across talent acquisition, strategic partnership and investment, alongside the founding of Dutch Blockchain Week, which would become BCNL’s most visible and internationally consequential annual output. His operational instinct has always been directional: identifying where technical potential and market reality are not yet in contact and building the structures that bring them together. Scheele’s contribution operates at a different register. His particular skill developed across consulting engagements with dozens of blockchain projects internationally is making cryptographic complexity legible to audiences whose decisions shape the conditions in which technology either advances or stalls. A distributed ledger explanation that a logistics director can act on, a description of smart contract execution that a bank executive can evaluate against their own operational risk framework, a regulatory briefing that gives an AFM official enough conceptual grounding to ask the right questions this is the communication work that most technology organisations are structurally incapable of doing well, because the people who understand the technology deeply are rarely the people who understand the institutional context in which it must find permission to operate. BCNL was built around both capabilities simultaneously, which is a rarer founding condition than it appears.
The decade of work that followed produced a foundation with a genuinely unusual footprint. Dutch Blockchain Week has grown from a national gathering into the flagship European crypto event, drawing international participants for whom the Netherlands has become the obvious jurisdiction to engage with European blockchain policy in practice rather than in abstraction. BCNL has advised the Dutch Ministry of Finance and the Authority for the Financial Markets on the implementation of MiCAR, the EU’s comprehensive legal framework for crypto-assets, in a capacity that required the organisation to navigate the specific tension between regulatory ambition and innovation pace that has characterised Europe’s approach to digital assets throughout the post-2020 period. Its partner network spans ABN AMRO and ING on the central bank digital currency side, CMS and Loyens and Loeff on regulatory guidance, and Microsoft and IBM on the enterprise infrastructure integration work that remains one of the least publicly visible but most practically significant dimensions of blockchain’s institutional adoption. The January 2026 Stablecoin Summit, developed jointly with Deloitte, is the most precise illustration of how far the agenda has moved. In 2016, BCNL events were making the case for blockchain’s existence as a credible technology. In 2026, the summit’s focus was the programmable euro — the practical integration of MiCAR-compliant stablecoins into Dutch retail and logistics operations. The organisation is no longer managing a conversation about whether blockchain is legitimate. It is managing the considerably more complex conversation about what legitimate deployment looks like in an environment where the regulatory framework has caught up with the ambition but the operational infrastructure is still being built.
The forward agenda BCNL is now executing reflects a strategic assessment about where the technology’s credible institutional applications actually lie. The Circular Economy Taskforce developing distributed ledger applications for carbon credit tracking and agricultural supply chain transparency represents a category of use case that has consistently survived the scrutiny that more speculative blockchain applications have not: the independent verifiability of sustainability claims is a genuine institutional problem in a regulatory environment where greenwashing liability is real and growing. The planned expansion into Eindhoven and Enschede, developed in partnership with universities including TU Eindhoven, addresses the structural risk that national foundations in small countries tend to become capital-centric by default concentrating activity in Amsterdam while the engineering talent that constitutes the actual long-term asset of the ecosystem is trained and employed elsewhere. The work on blockchain as a verification layer for AI training data provenance sits at the intersection of two of the most consequential institutional concerns of the current period: the proliferation of AI-generated content and the growing demand from regulators, litigants and institutional users for some form of independently verifiable record of where that content and the data that produced it came from. The most structurally interesting item on the forward agenda, however, is the consideration of a partial DAO model by 2028 the issuance of Contribution Tokens to longstanding members with direct voting rights over grant allocation and event programming. For a foundation that has spent a decade making the case for decentralised governance to institutions deeply invested in centralised control, beginning to implement that governance model within its own organisational structure is not an incremental step. It is a test of whether the argument BCNL has been making for ten years holds under the conditions its own operation creates.
The Netherlands founded the world’s first stock exchange in 1602, an institutional innovation that solved a specific coordination problem how to distribute risk across participants who had no prior mechanism for doing so in a way that generated economic consequences far beyond what any individual participant in the original structure anticipated. BCNL has spent a decade making the explicit argument that blockchain is the natural extension of that institutional inheritance: a mechanism for distributing trust across participants who currently depend on centralised intermediaries to perform functions that, at sufficient scale and under sufficient regulatory clarity, a distributed system could perform more efficiently. Van Ee and Scheele have been right about the coordination problem from the beginning. The Dutch ecosystem needed a trusted body that could perform the institutional functions the market would not perform for itself, and BCNL has performed them with enough consistency that its credibility with government, enterprise and the international crypto community now constitutes an asset that is genuinely difficult to replicate from a standing start.
The question the next decade poses is whether the coordination function that justified the foundation’s existence in 2016 is the same function that justifies it in 2035 or whether the ecosystem BCNL built has matured to the point where the most important contribution the foundation can make is demonstrating, from within its own governance structure, what decentralised institutional coordination actually looks like when the people advocating for it are prepared to live inside it.
